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“The fi re community is notorious for dealing better with things 
than with people, for thinking with their hands, even as they 
admit their core “challenges” are social and political. 
Instead, they look for technological fi xes where institutional reforms 
may be more fundamental. In recent years, they have cranked out 
a metric ton of high-quality studies on policy without 
probing the fundamental political ecology of fi re. They insist on 
‘science-based’ solutions, even though the crux of most disputes
 —the bottlenecks in moving plans into the fi eld—
lies in a politics charged by disputes over ethics and esthetics. 
They thus often treat public opinion as though it were 
an overgrown woods, needing only a suitable prescription 
for silvi-social thinning in order for an agreement to emerge, 
a problem that can be ‘solved’ by proper ‘social science’ research. 
This mind-set only prolongs the agony.”   
Stephen J. Pyne, Ph.D., 2003
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2I N T R O D U C T I O N
After the historic 2000 fi re season, the Andrus Center for Public Policy 
and the Idaho Statesman convened a conference, The Fires Next Time, which 
brought together fi re experts, state and local offi cials, the insurance industry, 
timber executives, and environmentalists. We wanted answers to the vexing 
dilemma: how to change policy to begin to prevent these almost annual 
catastrophic fi res. 
Those discussions brought a remarkable degree of consensus. Everyone 
agreed that we must shift from a federal policy that reacts to fi re to one that 
adopts proactive measures to reduce fi re threats to western communities. 
Three years later, it is painfully obvious that progress on change has been 
glacially slow. 
In 2003, it was California’s turn to suffer through an unusually 
devastating fi re season. In 12 days, 22 people were killed, 183 fi refi ghters 
were injured, 3,500 homes were 
lost, and more than 740,000 
acres of forest and brush lands 
were consumed. In the rest of 
the West, the 2002 fi re season 
was nearly as fi erce as the 2000 
season. All of these fi res confi rm the reality addressed in The Fires Next Time: 
The West faces huge fi res and huge consequences for decades unless it can 
learn how to manage fi re and people. 
Both funding shortfall and political disagreements have slowed the pace 
of meaningful efforts to thin, log, and burn western forests. Budget shortfalls 
are likely to continue to hamper fi re policy reform efforts although money 
is not the major issue. The Bush Administration’s effort to curb the agencies’ 
blank check is a good fi rst step, but it needs a detailed plan for reform that 
will probably cost at least as much as the current system. Congress approved 
President Bush’s “Healthy Forests Initiative,” which would direct $762 million 
in federal funds to thinning projects. The law, which sends 50% of the money 
to areas near communities, moves the debate back toward the consensus of 
2000, but it still falls short of the full-scale return that is necessary to address 
this challenge. 
First, coordination and cooperation among federal agencies must 
improve, and natural bureaucratic aversion to change must be overcome. 
Next, completing fi re management plans that allow managers to make good 
decisions about what fi res to fi ght aggressively and what fi res to monitor must 
become a high priority in all the agencies. Third, funding must be prioritized 
and sent to the region where the problem exists, the West, instead of being 
politically divided nationwide. Finally, local government and individual 
homeowners must take more responsibility to protect themselves. 
The best that can be said regarding this pace of policy change is that 
the same old political disagreements will serve to narrow the scope of where 
thinning and logging activities will take place. Environmentalists, forest 
agencies, local offi cials, the timber industry, and others may well be able to 
agree on some fi re prevention projects, but the agreements will be project 
by project, for the most part. We simply must do more. We must display the 
political and management will to force additional progress—and we must do 
it quickly. The new forest health legislation will test this will. 
Our fi re fi ghters do good and noble work, and they deserve our thanks. 
Many are also receiving hazard pay, which they clearly deserve, but the extra 
dollars in the pay envelope help explain some of their eagerness to stay on 
Both funding shortfall and political disagreements have 
slowed the pace of meaningful efforts to thin, log, and 
burn western forests.
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decision- making, slows down dramatically during the summer fi re season. 
Many of the delays in proactive thinning and fi re prevention programs are a 
result of the fact that project planners are off fi ghting fi res. 
Unless Congress is prepared to increase substantially the size of the Forest 
Service and to separate fi re suppression efforts from the forest restoration 
programs, this will be a continuing problem. Taking those two steps would be 
one way to reduce the gridlock. Still, at the root of all questions about fi re, we 
fi nd profound disagreement over the purposes of the national forests and over 
the methods of forest management. 
In a number of areas, including Idaho, discussions have begun over the 
issue of small wood. There does seem to be agreement that getting smaller-
diameter wood off the forests makes sense, helps prevent catastrophic fi res, 
addresses forest health issues, and supports local economies. More needs to be 
done in developing markets that can utilize the small-diameter wood. This is 
a project that both environmentalists and industry should be able to embrace. 
Policy makers could mandate the use of rustic log fencing on public forest 
roads or wood erosion stabilizers for use in burned-out gullies. Increasing use 
of this type of wood fi ber could be made in particle board manufacturing, in 
log homes, and in power generation. 
Perhaps the most important way to move policy change along is to 
concentrate on areas of agreement: Concentrate immediate efforts close to 
communities at risk in order that trust can be built. Encourage private property 
owners to aggressively protect their own homes. Detail Smokey the Bear—the 
Forest Service’s most effective spokesman—to work telling homeowners, 
“Only you can protect your home from wildfi re.”
Finally, leaders of the environmental community, the timber industry, 
unions, and local governments need to acknowledge that the forest wars of the 
last century are over. The Bush Administration could encourage this dialogue 
with an honest assessment: Industrial forestry on national forests is largely a thing 
of the past. Today, restoration, forest health, and fi re prevention are the jobs of the 
U. S. Forest Service, and all the parties must get on board. 
Westerners are in the midst of a crisis that demands a willingness to 
take risks, show leadership, and act immediately. If we don’t get on with the 
change in policy, the priceless forests we all love will be lost for generations, 
and the cost to people and property will continue to be frightful.
• • •
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In December of 2000, the Andrus Center for Public Policy convened 
a conference that sought to examine the history, science, and policy of fi re 
management. The severity of the 2000 fi re season was the inspiration for 
the conference. The Chief of the U. S. Forest Service, Dale Bosworth, later 
noted that the conference helped begin a conversation that would lead to the 
development of a comprehensive strategy to address the growing risks from 
wildland fi res. The Andrus Center issued a white paper on the conference, 
one that presented a number of fi ndings based on what was said and promised 
that day.
After three fi re seasons and a change in presidential administration, 
it’s time to revisit those fi ndings to see what has happened since then. 
In several cases, our original fi ndings have been combined to refl ect events 
more accurately events that have occurred since the conference. 
FINDING NO. 1: We need to rethink our beliefs and myths about fire. 
In many cases, fi re belongs on the western landscape. Fire is often not as 
bad as we have historically thought it to be.
It keeps being said, but it hasn’t happened yet. There is a role for fi re, 
but it seems likely that what are perceived as “catastrophic” fi res in the media 
makes that message hard to hear. During the 2002 fi re season, for example, 
governors, such as Jane Hull of Arizona, called for more fi re fi ghters. 
5“Unless someone begins the task of re-centering fi re 
and fi re management within the larger culture, 
all its research will either become the political 
equivalent of money-laundering or be frittered 
away in a frenzy of hot-spotting.”
Steven J. Pyne, Ph.D.
To Steven J. Pyne, our conference 
keynoter, the problem remains much 
as it did three years ago. As he recently 
noted, “Unless someone begins 
the task of re-centering fi re and fi re 
management within the larger culture, 
all its research will either become 
the political equivalent of money-
laundering or be frittered away in a 
frenzy of hot-spotting.” (Pyne, 2003)
It is also clear that fi re is but one tool to be used by managers as they 
attempt to implement the forest health legislation. What is more, it cannot 
be used everywhere. Some forests, for example, are not suitable for fuel 
treatments designed to alter fi re behavior. 
FINDING NO. 2: The conflict between prescribed burning and air quality 
regulations must be reconciled. 
As noted by National Wildfi re Coordinating Group in its Fire 
Effects Guide: 
The effects of smoke on health, air quality, and regional haze is 
very important to all land managers. They must recognize the need 
to manage smoke from wildland fi res, using the Best Available 
Control Measures. Every manager must determine the level of smoke 
management necessary to provide the least impact on the public, both 
in terms of health and visibility. The effects of smoke on fi refi ghters also 
must be considered when managing wildland fi res. If federal agencies 
do not take a rational, voluntary approach to smoke management, a 
mandatory approach may 
be provided that makes 
it more diffi cult to meet 
resource management goals 
and objectives. (92)
Prescribed burning and clean air represent two public goods seemingly 
at odds with each other. It is likely that optimum prescribed fi re activities 
will be constrained by public health and visibility goals of the Clean Air 
Act. At this point, it seems that federal land managers may have been more 
responsive to air quality concerns than their counterparts have been to the 
Prescribed burning and clean air represent two public 
goods seemingly at odds with each other.
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two hundred years ago when smoke was likely to be encountered throughout 
the fi re season. At the same time, with rising concerns over the global warming 
issue, fi re in the west does need clear justifi cation by the humans in charge of 
its management. 
FINDINGS NO. 3 AND 5: One-time increases in fire monies will be 
insuffi cient to solve the problem and may set the federal land management 
agencies up for failure. A ten to fi fteen-year plan with appropriate 
accountability and funding mechanisms is needed. Consideration should 
be given to establishing a revolving fi re fund for a minimum of 15 years.
Fire suppression and rehabilitation funds need to be closely monitored 
and spent more wisely.
There are several issues here. The fi rst concerns long-term funding. 
Congress has not established a revolving fund but has continued its support 
of fi re-related funding. According to the Congressional Research Service, 
President Bush’s budget requests have continued along the lines of the effort 
begun in 2000 under President Clinton. Congress has supported and added a 
bit to those requests. 
The question of fi re suppression funding is more complex and charged. 
For a time, the Bush Administration proposed not restoring all the funds that 
had been borrowed from other spending accounts for suppression activities 
during the 2002 fi re season. This action by the Administration had the effect 
of paralleling the arguments of those, such as Randall O’Toole of the Thoreau 
Institute, who are saying that reimbursement essentially gave a “blank check” 
to agencies and thus an incentive to suppress fi res. Although most of the 
money has been restored, O’Toole’s arguments have some merit. Last year, the 
Forest Service applauded Clearwater and Nez Perce National Forest supervisors 
Larry Dawson and Bruce Bernhardt for their ambitious use of fi re during a 
relatively active fi re season. The two allowed natural fi res to treat thousands of 
acres of land that would have otherwise had to have been artifi cially thinned 
or burned at a far higher cost. 
FINDING NO. 6: Support for locally-based, collaborative solutions is strong, 
but these concepts need more defi nition and development. 
Unfortunately, collaboration appeared compromised for a while by 
national political strategy and the President’s “Healthy Forests Initiative.” 
So, too, has the lack of success of so-called Stewardship Initiatives, such as 
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sportsmen, Native Americans, and environmentalists forged an agreement 
that allowed extensive logging, 
restoration, and road-closures. The 
Forest Service was unable to make the 
funding work, and the consensus fell 
apart. Consensus has held together, 
however, for thinning projects 
around Idaho City on the Boise National Forest. Locally-based consensus 
efforts remain an important part of an overall strategy. But ultimately, the 
federal agencies, states, and local governments will remain accountable for 
the success of wildfi re policy reform. With the passage of a compromise forest 
health bill, however, perhaps collaborative efforts will have more promise in 
the future. 
FINDING NO. 7: Fire policy decisions will be constrained by disagreement 
over the direction of forest and range policy. Decision-making methods need 
to be suffi ciently broadly based to eliminate the need for litigation. 
FINDING NO. 8: There is strong disagreement over the appropriate mix 
of prescribed fi re, thinning, and logging as management tools. There 
is consensus, however, that fuel reduction should begin near at-risk 
communities and work outward.
Disagreement remains as illustrated by the debate over the Forest Health 
bill passed by Congress. The compromise legislation targets about half the 
new monies on fuel reduction in the wildland urban zone, our “consensus 
lands,” as discussed in the white paper. 
We remain convinced that the consensus 
is still there. Larger debates and ideologies, 
however, make is diffi cult to move on that 
consensus. It should not surprise anyone any 
longer that people will use science to support 
pre-determined agendas. But we remain convinced that what we said earlier 
is true: The political consensus is to start in the interface fi rst. There is at this 
point no defi nitive scientifi c evidence that would override that consensus. 
Stephen Pyne has pointed out that what remains in confl ict is what he 
terms “the land between.” As he puts it:
“The future of wildland fi re depends on the future of wildlands. But 
between the intermix landscape and those places legally reserved as 
wilderness or parks lies an unsettled public domain. Some reasonable 
agreement exists about what to do with fi re at the poles of the urban 
and the wild; there is little regarding the land between them. Yet that is 
where the worst fi res are fl ourishing, where the contest over thinning 
and burning is fi ercest, and where the nation remains most irresolute. 
It is where the imperial narrative is now playing out. The Land Between 
will probably replace the intermix fi re as fi re’s next new thing.
Because Americans cannot agree on what those lands should be, they 
cannot craft a consensual strategy for managing fi re on them.”
The new forest health legislation will test our ability to come to that 
consensual strategy on these lands.
With the passage of a compromise forest health 
bill, however, perhaps collaborative efforts will have 
more promise in the future.
“The future of wildland fi re depends 
on the future of wildlands.”
Steven J. Pyne, Ph.D.
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to the original consensus we saw at the 2000 conference. The governors of 
New Mexico and Arizona, Bill Richardson and Janet Napolitano, have argued 
that more attention needs to 
be paid to at-risk communities. 
They have said that at least 
70% of proposed “forest health” 
projects should be in areas 
around communities and that 
the Forest Service should be prohibited from borrowing from other accounts 
to fund fi re-fi ghting efforts. These are Democratic state offi cials talking, and 
thus the argument that those closer to the ground have a better sense of what 
should be done will be tested here. 
FINDING NO. 9: Wildfire policy solutions need to be linked to other land 
management policies and laws where possible. 
Forests and range lands are managed for a wide variety of values, and 
those values have shifted dramatically in the last 30 years. Industrial forestry 
is no longer the dominant use on national forests. Cattle-grazing, while still 
an important use on federal range lands, is losing its dominance to recreation 
and perhaps energy development. Fire policy has far too often, in the history 
of public lands management, been an end unto itself. Ever since the fi rst 
cavalrymen used buckets and shovels to fi ght fi re in Yellowstone in 1886, fi re 
control has been the foundation of land management. Part of the solution is 
loosening the control over fi re and increasing the emphasis on shifting land 
use to fi t within the limits of the land, fi res, fl oods, and droughts. 
• • •
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